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hearings entitle it to apply a && novo decisional standard, 
substituting its judgment for the agency's findings of fact? 
Standard of Review: Agency interpretations regarding 
questions of general law are reviewed without deference for 
correctness. Utah Pep't of Corrections v. Pespain, 824 p.2d 439, 
443 n.8 (Utah App. 1991). 
3. May the CSRB base its review of agency personnel 
decisions on events that take place only after the agency decision 
has become final? 
Standard of Review: Agency interpretations regarding 
questions of general law are reviewed without deference for 
correctness. Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, and 
rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues before the Court is 
contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below 
The Department of Corrections ("Department") relies on the 
statement of the case as set forth in its principal brief. 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
While relying on the facts as set forth in its principal 
brief, the Department finds it necessary to correct certain 
misimpressions arising from CSRB's statement of facts. First, 
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 er w a s set j: o r hearing and 
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conviction, Corrections attempted to have the matter remanded" 
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con\ - .
 w * _ * „ au.oi J. y : I"' >"' ,„ Hin record further 
reflects that «• a prehearing conference held on Jui") /, '.win., ihe 
Department a a-: stipulate to a stay of CSRB proceedings 
pending t ci r11 j iid u:\jil LOII nil i i i i habeas corpus 
attacking g r i e v a n t 1 ? criminal conviction Ilk, it/ I), The stay was 
r lifted \:r* - : •• I'>l».' (T<. lfi7t:"0- fully six months after the 
conviction *-; -j. »i i ' i VI-TILM- I'iil'f, i n q i'hp s t a y w a s n o t 
placed in the state rreil system to the Department until the 
J o i l i - ii I ii'ii''''! rli in", a Thursday (k. ^^ , ., . The Department filed its 
motion for remand on June 16, 1992 (R. 1680), well in advance of 
the prehearing conference set for June 24, 1992 (R. 1678), and 
before a hearing officer was assigned to the case. It would have 
been inappropriate for the Department to move for remand while the 
stay was in effect, and the motion was timely filed after the stay 
was lifted. Following the Board's June 26 denial of the motion for 
remand and its assignment of a hearing officer to the case 
(R. 1690), the Department sought reconsideration of the motion on 
July 2, 1992 (R. 1698-99). The motion for reconsideration was 
transmitted to the hearing officer by CSRB Administrator Robert N. 
White on July 9, 1992 (R. 1700-01) and was denied eight days later 
(R. 1702-03). Not until July 17, 1992--more than a month after the 
initial motion for remand was filed--did the newly appointed 
hearing officer invite the parties to schedule a step 5 hearing 
(R. 1703) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This is a case about whether the Department of Corrections had 
adequate reason to terminate the employment of a correctional 
officer who violated three provisions of the Department's Code of 
Conduct. As a self-professed "unbiased" reviewer (£££ Brief of CSRB 
at 39), the Board exercised its jurisdiction to determine the 
propriety of the Department's actions on appeal, requiring the 
Department to defend its position, and ultimately ordering damages 
and injunctive relief against the Department. On further appeal to 
this Court, the Department must once again defend its decision in 
4 
order to show that the relief ordered by CSRB was erroneously 
granted. Because the Board performed an entirely adjudicative 
role, it has no greater interest in this dispute than a court has 
in the cases it adjudicates. Just as a court is not a proper 
respondent in appeals from its decisions, the Board--lacking a 
stake in the outcome--is not a proper respondent here. 
The Board's actions are governed by Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 67-19a-101 through 408 (1993). While these provisions leave no 
question that the Board may hold evidentiary hearings, they contain 
no indication that a si£ novo decisional standard applies. In fact, 
the deferential "substantial evidence" standard of proof contained 
in Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-406 (2) (c) (1993) suggests the opposite. 
With respect to the nature of its evidentiary hearings, the Board 
fails to distinguish purpose from process. The Department has 
never challenged the Board's statutory right to use the evidentiary 
hearing process for a limited purpose: to assure that the 
Department's reasons for imposing discipline are factually 
supported and that the discipline imposed is not abusively 
disproportionate to those reasons. Where the Department's 
findings, or reasons, enjoy factual support in the evidence adduced 
before the Board, the Department's choice of sanction must be 
measured against those findings for internal consistency--not 
against some other arguable construction of the record. This Court 
held as much in Despain. 
By holding itself out as the ultimate finder of fact, the 
Board asserts a right to consider the evidence as it exists at the 
5 
time of the CSRB hearing rather than at the time of the 
Department's personnel action--a proposition without cited 
precedent. To condone the Board's theory would be to require 
Department clairvoyance. An agency's discretion in personnel 
matters cannot depend on its ability to foretell future events. If 
a change in fact is material to the outcome of agency disciplinary 
action, the agency taking the action should have the first 
opportunity to consider its impact in light of the agency's 
particular mission and needs. Nothing less satisfies the 
discretion given to department heads by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 67-19-18(5) (1993) and by Utah's appellate courts. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AN AGENCY ACTING SOLELY TO ADJUDICATE A DISPUTE BETWEEN 
OTHER PARTIES IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE RESPONDENT ON APPEAL. 
Review of the orders of administrative agencies is governed by 
Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Under subsection 
(a) of the rule, "[i]n each case, the agency shall be named 
respondent." In accordance with this provision, the present 
appeal--a dispute between the Department of Corrections and its 
former employee--has been recaptioned "Utah Department of 
Corrections, Appellant, v. Career Service Review Board and Michael 
Dean Hummel, Respondents." Yet the Board has no stake in this 
appeal. It is not a party for or against which relief may be 
granted. Its participation in the dispute has been solely as an 
adjudicator. Its interest in the outcome is similar to this 
6 
Court's interest in review of its opinions by Utah!s supreme court: 
while the result may change the Court!s interpretation and 
application of law# the Court's position is adequately represented 
by its decisions at an earlier stage in the case. 
Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, like 
its Utah analogue, states that "[i]n each case the agency must be 
named respondent" in an appeal from an agency order. Construing 
this language, federal courts have declined to apply it to agencies 
performing purely adjudicative functions. For example, in McCord 
v. Benefits Review Board. 514 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the court 
dealt with a board decision which overturned a denial of 
compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' 
Compensation Act ("LHWCA") . Despite Rule 15(a) !s directive, and 
despite statutory language requiring the clerk of court to transmit 
a copy of the petition for review "to the Board, and to the other 
parties" (33 U.S.C. 921(c) (Supp. II 1972)), the court held that 
the board was not the intended respondent under the rule. As the 
court noted, 
[n]ormally, a single private party is contesting the 
action of an agency, which agency must appear and defend 
on the merits to insure the proper adversarial clash 
requisite to a "case or controversy." But Rule K b ) , 
Fed.R.App.P. [analogous language appears at Utah R. App. 
P. 1(d)], says that "[t]hese rules shall not be construed 
to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the courts of 
appeals as established by law." Here, there is 
sufficient adversity between [the parties] to insure 
proper litigation without participation by the Board. To 
require the Board to appear as a party would parallel 
requiring the District Court to appear and defend its 
decision upon direct appeal. Further, the Supreme Court 
has held that indispensability of parties is to turn on 
practical considerations. 
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McCord. 514 F.2d at 200. The court concluded that " [d] espite the 
arguable literal applicability of Rule 15(a), Fed.R.App.P., it is 
clear that a requirement that the Benefits Review Board litigate 
herein as a party would merely burden the time and resources of 
that agency." Id, 
Other cases and courts have held similarly. The Third Circuit 
followed the logic of McCordf noting the parallel between the 
Benefits Review Board's function and that of a reviewing court: 
Certainly those courts had no duty or interest in 
defending their actions on appeal. There appears to be 
no reason why the Benefits Review Board should be thought 
to have such a duty or interest. At best, it is a 
nominal respondent, and we have no concern that it will 
disregard a mandate in a case in which it is not so 
named. 
Nacirema Operating Co. v. Benefits Review Bd. . 538 F.2d 73, 75 (3d 
Cir. 1976); accord, Krolick Contracting Corp. v. Benefits Review 
EsL., 558 F.2d 685, 689 (3d Cir. 1977) ("We find no reason for 
reconsidering the Nacirema Operating Co. holding that the Benefits 
Review Board, performing adjudicatory functions only, is not a 
proper respondent.") . Likewise, in Shahady v. Atlas Tile & Marble 
Co. . 673 F.2d 479, 484-85 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the District of 
Columbia Circuit again rejected the Benefits Review Board as a 
respondent on grounds of its adjudicative role. The court observed 
that "Rule 15(a) contemplates that the agency respondent defend the 
agency's (commission, or board) decision because the respondent 
represents the agency. In LHWCA cases, the Benefits Review 
Board--as a purely adjudicative entity--functions as a district 
court." The Fifth Circuit, noting two Ninth Circuit dismissals of 
8 
the Benefits Review Board as a respondent, also ruled that 
" [n]either the statutory provisions for review, nor rule 15(a), 
F.R.A.P., requires the Board to be a party, nor is its presence as 
a party necessary to effectuation of orders this court may enter," 
Offshore Food Serv., Inc. v. Benefits Review Bfl., 524 F.2d 967, 967 
(5th Cir. 1975) (citation omitted). And the First Circuit, while 
declining to rule on the propriety of the Benefits Review Board as 
respondent, characterized its naming under Rule 15(a) as "a purely 
formal exercise.H Prolerized New England Co. v. Benefits Review 
£ ^ , 637 F.2d 30, 40 (1st Cir. 1980), cert, denied. 452 U.S. 938 
(1981) . 
The Fourth Circuit, having previously rejected the Benefits 
Review Board as a proper respondent in I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore v. 
Benefits Review Board, 529 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1975) , subsequently 
distinguished review of Benefits Review Board orders in LHWCA cases 
from review of actions by agencies which directly confer or deny 
benefits: "Most other statutes providing for judicial review of 
agency action are simply not analogous to the LHWCA because under 
them true adversity exists between the claimant of a government 
benefit and the government agency which seeks to withhold it." 
I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore v. Benefits Review Bd.P 542 F.2d 903, 907 
n.4 (4th Cir. 1976) (en banc), vacated and remanded on other 
grounds sub nom Adkins v, l.T.Q. Corpt of Baltimore/ 433 U.S. 904 
(1977) . The court held that in such cases, "the agency must be 
named a respondent since it is the party against whom relief is 
sought; the court could not grant an effective remedy without its 
9 
presence." Id. 
Cases rejecting an adjudicative agency as respondent are not 
limited to those involving the Benefits Review Board. The Federal 
Circuit Court, in reviewing cases arising from decisions of the 
Merit Systems Protection Board--the federal analogue to the Career 
Service Review Board--has unequivocally ruled that the MSPB is not 
a proper respondent on appeal in cases it has adjudicated on the 
merits. In Hagmeyer v. Department of Treasury, 809 F.2d 1581 (Fed. 
Cir. 1987), a federal employee sought review of the MSPB!s denial 
of attorney fees. Overruling contrary precedent, the court held 
"that MSPB is not the proper party respondent in appeals to this 
court in cases in which the appellate jurisdiction of the board 
under 5 U.S.C. § 7701 (1982) [including employee appeals from any 
action appealable to the MSPB] was invoked, or was sought to be 
invoked, by a petitioner to the board." Hagmeyer, 809 F.2d at 
1582. The court noted in a subsequent amplification of the above 
case that "[t]he touchstone enunciated by the court for determining 
who is to be named respondent is !the agency responsible for taking 
the action.1" Hagmeyer v, Pep't of Treasury, 852 F.2d 531, 534 
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing Hopkins v, Merit Sys, Protection Bd,/ 725 
F.2d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
The MSPB!s role in judicial appeals was reconsidered in 1991, 
following legislative amendment of 5 U.S.C.A. § 7703(a)(2) (Supp. 
1991), which governs judicial review of MSPB decisions. Two 
federal employees appealed from the board's denial of their 
petitions challenging settlement agreements with the employing 
10 
agencies. The Federal Circuit Court found it "abundantly clear 
that in overruling Hagmeyer, Congress intended that the Board shall 
be the respondent in all appeals involving its jurisdiction or its 
rulings on procedural questions, but that in appeals involving 
underlying personnel actions and attorney fees, the employing 
agencies shall be the respondents." Amin v. Merit Sys. Protection 
Bd. . 951 F.2d 1247, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Nonetheless, while 
acknowledging that one of the consolidated appeals raised primarily 
procedural issues, the court found that although the appellant 
challenged the actions of the board1s administrative law judge, "he 
is seeking to overturn a decision which effectively disposed of his 
case on the merits." Id. at 1253. The court held "that in cases 
where, as in this case, the appeal from the Board's decision 
presents mixed questions of procedure and the merits of an agency 
action, the employing agency is the proper respondent." Id. at 
1252. This is because "the agency which took the personnel action 
has the primary interest in upholding its position and has 
available the material needed to defend its personnel actions in 
the appeals to this court." IsL. 
Unlike the federal statutes governing appeals from MSPB 
decisions, which deny employing agencies the right to initiate 
appeals from MSPB determinations, the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act gives any party aggrieved by final agency action the 
right to judicial review. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1) (1993) 
states that "[a] party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of 
final agency action, except in actions where judicial review is 
11 
expressly prohibited by statute." Nothing in title 67, chapter 19a 
of the Utah Code, which governs state employment grievance and 
appeal procedures, prohibits state employers from seeking judicial 
review. This procedural distinction, however, does not vitiate the 
logic on which the Federal Circuit Court relied in the MSPB cases 
or its applicability to this appeal. Whether appearing as 
appellant or respondent, the agency responsible for taking the 
personnel action is still the party adverse to the employee. A 
ruling on the merits is no less a ruling on the merits because it 
favors the employee rather than the agency. Regardless of its 
posture on appeal, the employing agency still has the primary 
interest in upholding its position and the materials needed to 
defend it. The alignment of the parties does not convert the 
Board's adjudicative role to something different. The Board, as a 
neutral adjudicator, is simply not the appropriate respondent in 
appeals from its merits decisions. 
Addressing an issue of agency standing to obtain judicial 
review, the Supreme Court of Utah cited favorably the principle 
enunciated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court: 
"To hold that the Public Service Commission should 
not only decide between those conflicting interests in 
its judicial capacity, but also should represent the 
state in protecting public rights, would make the 
Commission both judge and advocate at the same time. 
Such a concept violates our sense of fair play and due 
process which we believe administrative agencies acting 
in a quasi-judicial capacity should ever observe." 
Utah Pep't of Business Regulation v, Pub. Serv. Cpnm'n, 614 P.2d 
1242, 1253 (Utah 1980) (quoting Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 261 
Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, 523 (1952)). To permit the CSRB to act as 
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both judge and advocate in the present appeal is equally violative 
of the standards of fair play and due process to which the Board 
must be held. 
There is no question that the Department of Corrections is the 
agency responsible for taking the action on which this case is 
based. There is likewise no question that the merits of the 
dispute between grievant and the Department were at issue before 
the CSRB, or that the Board adjudicated those merits. The 
Department has the primary interest in upholding its position 
before this Court. It is the government agency which bears the 
ultimate responsibility to provide the relief ordered by the Board. 
The Board's presence is unnecessary on appeal in order for this 
Court to effect an appropriate remedy. Under precedent and 
principle, the Board is not an appropriate respondent in this case, 
and its participation should be limited to the role of an amicus. 
POINT II 
THE STATUTORY RIGHT TO TAKE EVIDENCE DOES NOT ENTITLE 
CSRB TO APPLY A DE NOVO DECISIONAL STANDARD IN ITS REVIEW 
OF AGENCY PERSONNEL ACTIONS. 
The Board# in its brief, spends considerable effort 
establishing its statutory right to hold an evidentiary hearing. 
It fails to acknowledge that at no time in the course of this 
litigation has the Department challenged the Board's right to take 
evidence in proceedings before it. Rather than dealing squarely 
with the issue of the appropriate standard of decision under its 
governing statute, the Board assumes that a d£ novo standard is 
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irrevocably linked with the right to take evidence. It further 
presumes that the agency decision to which deference is entitled is 
only the sanction applied to the contested conduct, not the finding 
of sanctionable conduct itself. The Board provides no support for 
this novel proposition, which implies that an agency selects its 
disciplinary sanctions in a factual vacuum. 
The Board's argument begins by reviewing the powers of CSRBfs 
historical analogues. The Board suggests that even its earliest 
predecessor, the Merit System Council, was the exclusive finder of 
fact in employee discipline. The very statute cited by the Board 
contradicts its argument. The language quoted in the CSRB brief 
unequivocally contemplates factfinding by the employing agency: 
"
!the normal rules of evidence in courts of law shall not apply in 
hearings before the department Fheafll or merit system council.1" 
Brief of CSRB at 9 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 67-13-14 (1969)) 
(emphasis altered); see also CSRB Addendum A at 524. That the 
statute contemplates agency factfinding indicates a measure of 
discretion vested in departmental employers. 
The Merit System Council rules cited by CSRB are similarly 
unpersuasive. Although they allowed for the presentation of 
evidence to the council, the evidentiary aspect of the hearing was 
clearly discretionary: the agency representative "'may introduce 
witnesses or material evidence in support of the agency's action.'" 
Brief of CSRB at 10 (quoting Merit Sys. P. art. Ill, § 2, 1 2.b(2)) 
(emphasis altered); £££ al££ CSRB Addendum B at 3. If evidence 
before the council was not mandated, the council could hardly have 
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been intended as the sole or ultimate factfinder. 
Nothing in these provisions granted the council the 
factfinding exclusivity promoted by the Board. Moreover, because 
the council was created and governed by legislation since repealed, 
there is no necessary identity between its powers and the Board's. 
Finally, the assertedly representative council opinion appended to 
CSRB's brief at Addendum C reveals nothing regarding the decisional 
standard applied by the council. The listed findings could derive 
as easily from a deferential review of agency findings as from 
original factfinding by the council. The Board's argument premised 
on the Merit System Council's powers is simply irrelevant to the 
issues for decision here. 
The Board's reliance on State v, Utah Merit System Council, 
614 P.2d 1259 (Utah 1980) (£££ Brief of CSRB at 11) is similarly 
misplaced. The case held that the exclusion of the employing 
agency's director from council proceedings was reversible error. 
The fact that the court found the director's presence necessary "to 
assure an accurate and complete disclosure of facts" (614 P.2d at 
12 62) again indicates nothing about the council's decisional 
standard. It merely demonstrates that where the council was 
invoked as an evidentiary forum, it could not deprive the 
department head her right to be present during the production of 
evidence. 
Like the Merit System Council, the Personnel Review Board 
("PRB") operated under statutes now repealed. Those statutes 
continued the permissive nature of evidence presentation before the 
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PRB: as quoted by CSRB, "'[t]he aggrieved employee and employer 
may/ in addition to the provisions of [section] 67-19-22, be 
present at all hearings, produce witnesses, examine and cross 
examine witnesses, and examine documentary evidence.'" Brief of 
CSRB at 12 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-25(5) (Supp. 1979)) 
(emphasis altered). The fact that the statute charged the hearing 
officer to "'render a written decision supported by findings of 
fact and conclusions of law'" (id,) does no more to establish a 
decisional standard with respect to those findings than the council 
provisions previously discussed. In fact, the Board's 1981 rules, 
contained in Addendum D to the Board's brief, leave the decisional 
standard to the discretion of the hearing officer: under State 
Employees' Grievance and App. P. 1 20.9 (1981 ed.), "[t]he hearing 
officer shall determine the quantum of proof." However, under the 
Board's later rule, on which this Court relied in Utah Department 
of Corrections v. Sucher. 796 P.2d 721, 722-23 (Utah App. 1990), 
"[a] hearing officer must 'give latitude and deference to an 
agency's prior decision when the latter was supported by the 
findings of fact based on the evidence.' Utah Admin.R. [sic] 
665-1-25.4 (1987-88)." This cited rule is notably contrary to the 
1981 provision, despite the Board's contention that "the rules 
cited by this court in Sucher were consistent with the earlier 
rules." Brief of CSRB at 13. 
The Board states that it was created in its present form in 
1989 under "Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-l [sic] et. [sic] seq." Brief 
16 
of CSRB at 13.1 It claims that "[t]here are several provisions of 
this act which specifically authorize the Board to hold evidentiary 
de novo hearings." Id. The Board points to no statute explicitly 
authorizing it to make original findings of fact without deference 
to the employing agency, and ignores precedent explicitly to the 
contrary. In fact, a close reading of title 67, chapter 19a, 
reveals that the term on which the Board so heavily relies--d^ 
&QYQ--appears nowhere in the text of the act. 
Regardless of whether an agency employer holds a formal 
evidentiary hearing before dismissing or demoting its employee or 
conducts only informal proceedings, Utah Code Ann. section 
67-19-18(5) (1993) requires the employer to articulate reasons for 
applying the selected sanction and to give the employee an 
opportunity to respond. These reasons, whether the agency arrives 
at them through a formal or informal process, are the "findings" of 
the agency to which deference is due if they are supported by 
substantial evidence--evidence that may, but need not, be adduced 
in an evidentiary hearing before the Board. Under Utah Code Ann. 
section 67-l9a-403(1) (1993), " [a]t any time after a career service 
employee submits a grievance to the [Board's] administrator under 
the authority of Section 67-19a-402, the administrator may attempt 
to settle the grievance informally by conference, conciliation, and 
persuasion with the employee and the agency." In other words, the 
Board need not take evidence to determine whether the agencyf s 
xUtah Code Ann. §§ 67-19a-101 through 408 (1993), enacted in 
1989, govern grievance and appeal procedures. Section 201 
creates the Career Service Review Board. 
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position is substantially justified: it may, in fact, act on the 
basis of the agency's articulated reasons, or findings. 
The Board likens its position to that of a district court 
reviewing an agency's informal proceedings under section 15 of the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA") , Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 63-46b-l through 22 (1993). It cites Archer v. Board of State 
Lands and Forestry. 275 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah Oct. 11, 1995) as a 
lodestar, suggesting that since the Department's disciplinary 
proceedings are "informal at best" under UAPA (Brief of CSRB at 33) , 
the Board's review, like the district court's in Archer, must be &£ 
novo. In Archer, the district court exerted its jurisdiction under 
UAPA's section 15 to review informal proceedings of the Division of 
State Lands and Forestry concerning the assignment of an easement. 
Section 15 provides that "[t]he district courts shall have 
jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final agency actions 
resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings" with certain 
exceptions not relevant here. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15 (1) (a) 
(Supp. 1995) (emphasis supplied). The critical phrase--Mby trial 
de novo"--is missing from CSRB's governing statutes. 
The Board's attempted analogy to Archer is fundamentally 
flawed. Rather than being classified as an informal proceeding 
under UAPA--as the agency hearing in Archer was--the Department's 
personnel action is specifically excluded from UAPA coverage. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(2) (1993) provides that UAPA "does not govern: 
(e) applications for employment and internal personnel actions 
within an agency concerning its own employees, or judicial review 
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of those actions." This provision not only disqualifies the 
Department's proceedings from UAPA governance, but precludes the 
application of direct judicial review under UAPA to the 
Department's actions. Consequently, even if the Board stood in the 
position of a district court reviewing informal proceedings, it 
would lack authority to review the Department's personnel action d£ 
novo under UAPA's section 15. The Board apparently wishes to enjoy 
the powers of a district court without being subject to the 
restraints on a district court's jurisdiction. Significantly, 
section 15's unequivocal grant of review by trial ds novo in 
district courts makes clear that when the legislature chose to give 
d£ novo powers to a forum reviewing administrative actions, it did 
so explicitly. The absence of a similar grant in CSRB's 
controlling statutes militates against a finding of d£ novo 
authority. 
While accusing the Department of "trying to confuse this court 
by dealing with semantics as to what the evidentiary hearing is" 
(Brief of CSRB at 17) , the Board engages in semantic deception 
regarding the decision entitled to deference. In discussing the 
effect of its decisional standards as reflected in its old and new 
rules, the Board states, "To infer that the old rule somehow gives 
deference to the findings of fact is inaccurate and in error." Id. 
Instead, it appears that the Board's misunderstanding of the 
Court's clear guidance is inaccurate and erroneous. In Utah Pep' t 
of Corrections v. Despain. the Court reiterated its prior holding 
in Sucher and the supreme court's holding in In re Discharge of 
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Jones. 720 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1986), that the role of the Board and 
its functional analogues is a limited one requiring deference to 
agency findings and conclusions. Of particular relevance is the 
Court's comment on the Board's failure to implement a correct 
decisional standard in its review of Despain's termination: 
Despite this clear direction, the CSRB, in its 
decision in this case, quoted one of its own previous 
decisions, stating, with our emphasis: "The Board's 
hearing officers are to exercise their own discretion as 
to what evidence or record will be relied upon for their 
overall decisionmaking at Step 5 . . . . The degree of 
deference granted tQ department' s findings and 
conclusions is discretionary with the Board and its 
hearing officers . . . ." The CSRB seems not to have 
applied the correct standard in reviewing the 
Department's decision to discharge Despain. 
Despainf 824 P.2d at 443, n.6 (underlined emphasis supplied). If 
this Court had found that the legislature intended the Board's 
review to be de novo, it could not have concluded that the standard 
applied by the Board in Despain was incorrect. Despain leaves no 
doubt that the Department's findings, as well as its conclusions, 
are entitled to deference on review. The Court categorically 
rejected the Board's denial of deference to Department findings in 
Despain, yet the Board has once again implemented a nondeferential 
decisional standard in the case at bar. Because the Board's 
decisional standard flouts Despain, it cannot stand. 
Under Utah Code Ann. section 67-19a-406(2)(c) (1993), M[t]he 
party with the burden of proof must prove their [sic] case by 
substantial evidence." CSRB's governing statutes do not define 
"substantial evidence." Its rules, however, define "substantial 
evidence" as "something more than a mere scintilla of evidence but 
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less than a preponderance. It is relevant evidence such as a 
reasonable person of an unprejudiced and thinking mind would accept 
as adequate to support the conclusion drawn from it," Utah Admin. 
Code R137-1-4. The supreme court, construing the term under UAPA, 
has held that "' [s]ubstantial evidence1 is that quantum and quality 
of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind 
to support a conclusion." First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. County Bd. 
of Equalization. 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990); accord Utah Ass'n 
of Counties v. Tax Comm'n, 895 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah 1995); U.St West 
Communications. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 882 p.2d 141, 146 (Utah 
1994) . In Utah Association of Counties, the supreme court reviewed 
a decision of the Tax Commission establishing a fair market value 
for certain property. The court, relying on this Court's decision 
in Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah 
App. 1989), held that under UAPAfs substantial evidence test, "[i]t 
is not our prerogative on review to reweigh the evidence. Instead, 
we defer to the Commission's findings because, when reasonably 
conflicting views arise, it is the Commission's province to draw 
inferences and resolve these conflicts." Utah Ass'n of Counties, 
895 P.2d at 821. I 
The Board's sole statutory function as a reviewing body is 
unmistakably clear. Under Utah Code Ann. section 67-19a-202(1) 
(1993), 
(a) The board shall serve as the final 
administrative body to review appeals from 
career service employees and agencies of 
decisions about promotions, dismissals, 
demotions, suspensions, written reprimands, 
wages, salary, violations of personnel rules, 
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issues concerning the equitable administration 
of benefits, reductions in force, and disputes 
concerning abandonment of position that have 
not been resolved at an earlier stage in the 
grievance procedure. 
(b) The Board has no jurisdiction to review or 
decide any other personnel matters. 
(Emphasis supplied.) In unequivocal language, the legislature has 
made both a positive grant of review authority and a positive 
denial of original decisionmaking power to the Board. By 
arrogating to itself greater powers under its review capacity than 
a reviewing court possesses, the Board usurps the discretion vested 
in agency employers over their own personnel functions. Just as it 
is not a reviewing court's prerogative to reweigh evidence, it is 
not the Board's prerogative to reweigh the evidence underlying the 
Department's findings. As the initial decisionmaker, the 
Department, like the Tax Commission in Utah Association of 
Counties, has the right to draw inferences from the evidence and 
resolve conflicting views in reaching its findings, to which the 
Board, on review, must defer if substantial evidence supports them. 
As this Court has remarked, "The law is clear that the CSRB must 
give 'latitude and deference' to the Department's personnel 
actions"- -not merely to the sanctions applied. Despain. 824 P.2d 
at 443. 
It is the Board, not the Department, which seeks judicially 
legislated changes to existing statutes. £j££ Brief of CSRB at 18. 
What is clearly not provided to the Board by statute is the power 
of si£ novo factfinding, and nothing in CSRB's lengthy brief shows 
the contrary. The Board would have the Court create that right out 
22 
of whole cloth. To do so would reverse well-established precedent, 
rewrite the legislative distribution of agency power, and read Utah 
Code Ann. section 67-19-18 (5) (e) (1993)--under which an "employee 
may be dismissed or demoted if the department head finds adequate 
cause or reason" (emphasis supplied)--out of existence. The 
Department respectfully submits that the Board has articulated no 
legal or policy basis for such a result. 
POINT III 
BECAUSE AN AGENCY CANNOT DISCIPLINE AN EMPLOYEE FOR 
FUTURE EVENTS, THE BOARD MAY NOT USE POST-DISCIPLINE 
EVENTS TO DISCREDIT THE AGENCY'S FACTUAL BASIS FOR 
DISCIPLINE. 
An agency and its employee do not appear before the Board as 
untested legal opponents. Rather, they are parties to a dispute 
that has been once resolved, however formally or informally. As 
shown above, the Board's limited role is to assure that an agency's 
reasons for resolving the dispute against the employee were based 
on evidence sufficient to support the inferences the agency drew 
from it, and that the sanction imposed is proportional to those 
inferences. It should be needless to say that an agency cannot 
draw inferences from information it did not possess at the time of 
its decision. It is manifest that an agency cannot possess 
knowledge of events that have not yet come to pass. 
Utah Code Ann. section 67-19-18(5)(e) (1993) requires a 
department head to find "adequate cause or reason" before demoting 
or dismissing an employee. Common sense dictates that adequate 
cause or reason must have a basis in evidence, whether or not 
adduced in a formal hearing, especially where the evidentiary basis 
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of the decision is subject to scrutiny by the Board, sitting in 
review. Common sense likewise dictates that the agency cannot have 
reasoned from non-existent facts; indeed, if it had, the Board 
would be obligated to find the agency's articulated rationale 
lacking in evidentiary support. Because some agencies do not make 
a reviewable record of the evidence on which they rely, the Board 
is statutorily permitted to require both agency and employee to 
place their evidence on record before a Board-appointed hearing 
officer. The Board's evidentiary powers, however, change neither 
the department head's burden nor the Board's limited scope of 
review. 
The Board "finds it difficult to understand why there is now 
a contesting of the Board's jurisdiction when Hummel appealed 
pursuant to statute and statute confers jurisdiction on the CSRB." 
Brief of CSRB at 37. The Department has never questioned the 
Board's jurisdiction to review the personnel action; it questions 
only the scope of that review. A close reading of CSRB's arguments 
reveals that the flaws inherent in its wrongful appropriation of de 
novo decisionmaking authority are magnified by the exercise of that 
unauthorized power in the context of changed facts. 
The Board premises its argument on an employee's asserted 
right "to appeal to the CSRB for a 'new hearing.1 See: Utah Code 
Ann. § 67-19a-401(5) ." Brief of CSRB at 31. Section 401(5) reads, 
in its entirety: 
(5) (a) Unless the employee meets the requirements for 
excusable neglect established by rule, an employee may 
submit a grievance for review under this chapter only if 
the employee submits the grievance: 
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(i) within 20 working days after the event 
giving rise to the grievance; or 
(ii) within 20 working days after the employee 
has knowledge of the event giving rise to the 
grievance. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (4)(a), an employee may 
not submit a grievance more than one year after the event 
giving rise to the grievance. 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(5) (1993) (emphasis supplied). The 
cited section does not authorize or even mention a "new hearing," 
as the Board implies; it authorizes only review of a preexisting 
grievance. The Boardfs self-serving interpretation is simply not 
borne out by the words of the statute. 
The Board further asserts that 
there is no formal hearing process under the protections 
of UAPA at Corrections1 level as part of the employee 
grievance process. As such, there is no record to be 
reviewed per se because UAPA considers such matters 
"informal." Informal matters have the right to formal 
adjudications as de novo hearings. While Corrections 
maintains that its record is sufficient, as a matter of 
law, it is not. 
Brief of CSRB at 32. The Boardfs analysis is both factually and 
legally defective. The Board incorrectly asserts that UAPA 
considers the Department's internal disciplinary proceedings 
informal. As previously pointed out (supra at 18-19), UAPA does 
not consider internal agency personnel actions informal; indeed, it 
does not consider them at all. S^SL Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-l(2)(e). Because UAPA does not apply to these actions, 
they are not adjudicated d£ novo as of right, as CSRB erroneously 
concludes. Ds novo adjudication is the standard applied to 
district courts reviewing UAPA-governed informal proceedings, such 
as in Archer--not to the Board under its separate statute. 
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Moreover, CSRB again misstates the Department's position by 
claiming that the Department maintains its record is sufficient for 
the Board's review. The Department does not challenge the Board's 
right to take evidence. It maintains only that if the evidence 
shows the Department's reasons to have been substantially 
supported, the Board must accept those reasons as the factual basis 
for the discipline imposed. 
The Board perpetuates its erroneous analysis by relying on In 
re Noren. 621 P.2d 1247 (Utah 1980). The Noren court faced the 
issue of whether a license applicant, whose application was 
administratively rejected on the basis of prior criminal 
convictions, was entitled to a new determination of the facts in a 
district court action filed after the convictions were expunged. 
The court's holding, that the facts were to be determined as of the 
time the court action was filed, rested on explicit statutory 
language that treated the filing as "'an original action in the 
district court'." Noren, 621 P.2d at 1248 (quoting Utah Code Ann. 
§41-3-26) . As even the Board acknowledges (see Brief of CSRB at 
34) , appeals from agency personnel actions are not original 
actions. For this reason, Noxen is not precedent for the Board's 
conclusion that M[i]n this case, the appeal to the CSRB is the 
beginning of the UAPA hearing process under the Grievance and 
Appeals Act" (Brief of CSRB at 35) , and the Board offers no other 
support for its contention. In fact, the Grievance and Appeals Act 
explicitly contemplates a unified multi-step process beginning with 
attempted resolution through discussion between the employee and 
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the supervisor (£££ Utah Code Ann. § 67-l9a-402(1)(a) (1993)) and 
ending with appeal to the Board (see Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-407 
(1993)). 
This Court has taken a more reasoned approach to consideration 
of information not known to an employing agency. In Tolman v. Salt 
Lake County Attorney. 818 P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1991) , the Court 
considered a decision of the Salt Lake County Career Services 
Council ("CSC") upholding the termination of an investigator. The 
CSC found that the investigator had committed acts inimical to 
public service in a June 11, 1986, battery. On review, this Court 
noted 
that the June 11th incident was irrelevant to whether 
Tolman's dismissal was based upon sufficient cause. If 
the [County Attorney's Office] did not know about the 
June 11th incident at the time of Tolman!s termination, 
the June 11th incident could not possibly have been a 
factor in the decision to dismiss Tolman. 
Tolman, 818 P.2d at 25, n.l. Even though the June 11 assault had 
been committed before Tolmanfs termination, the Court held it to be 
irrelevant to the agency's reasons for termination because it was 
unknown to the agency at the time the termination decision was 
made. It was therefore found to be unavailable as a post hoc 
rationalization for the agency's actions. If undisclosed 
pretermination conduct cannot properly be considered in reviewing 
the sufficiency of an agency's cause for discipline, surely the 
Board's reliance on post-termination events is overreaching, unless 
department heads are endowed with prescience. Moreover, because 
relevance is a function of relation to issues, not parties, there 
is no principled distinction to be made on the basis of which party 
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the irrelevant evidence favors. 
Finally, the fact that grievantfs conviction was subsequently 
overturned on grounds unrelated to his admission of the underlying 
criminal conduct is not, by itself, grounds for reversal of his 
termination from Department employment. In Peterson v. Utah Board 
of Pardons. 277 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah Nov. 3, 1995), the supreme 
court considered whether a parole revocation must be overturned 
when the paroleefs conviction of the crimes on which the revocation 
was based is reversed on procedural grounds. Peterson's parole was 
revoked on the grounds of criminal convictions in September of 
1990, less than six months before it would have terminated by law. 
While incarcerated on the parole violations, Peterson appealed the 
convictions, which were reversed on April 4, 1991, after the parole 
period would have run. The Parole Board then issued a new warrant 
based on the conduct underlying the reversed convictions. Peterson 
argued that the new warrant was untimely because the initial 
revocation, based on the convictions, was invalid; he contended 
that reversal of the convictions had exonerated him of the 
underlying crimes, and therefore that his parole had run by the 
time the new warrant was served. Rejecting Peterson's claim of 
exoneration, the court noted that "[t]he reversal did not undermine 
or in any way call into question the factual findings of his 
guilt." Peterson, 277 Utah Adv. Rep. at 11. 
Like Peterson's, grievant's conviction was overturned on 
procedural grounds unrelated to his adjudicated--and, in this case, 
admitted--conduct. Like Peterson, grievant has not been exonerated 
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To suggest otherwise asks the impossible. 
The Department's actions in this case were fully justified by 
the facts that existed at the time of its decision. The evidence 
before the Board showed as much. The Board's reinterpretation of 
those facts to justify a different outcome has no warrant in 
precedent or law. For these reasons, the Department respectfully 
asks the Court to reverse the decision of the Board and to 
reinstate the Department's order terminating grievant from 
employment. 
REQUEST REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLICATION 
As this case was fully argued on March 15 of this year, the 
Department believes further argument is unnecessary, but desires to 
participate if argument is ordered by the Court. Because employee 
grievances submitted to the Board will continue to raise the issue 
of the Board's correct decisional standard, the Department 
respectfully requests the Court to publish its opinion in this 
case. 
Dated this /^k day of December, 1995. 
< . ^ i Uc 
Nancy L.^Kemp 
Assistant Attorney General 
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